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The opening of the Persian wars in 1723 was followed by an increase in taxes, rising food prices, and scarcity of food supplies, all of which were accompanied by a continued debasement of coinage. On top of all this, extraordinary "campaign" taxes were levied to meet the needs of the Persian war. The "campaign" taxes of imad-i seferriye, avartz-i divaniye and takilif-i drfiye increased the agitation among the population 10) The higher taxes, the shrinking frontiers, and the agricultural decline resulted in the early eighteenth century in an unprecedented emigration from the provinces to the cities xx). The emigrants and refugees were II) The flight from the land to the cities was not peculiar to the early eighteenth century but an acceleration of a pattern begun during the Celali rebellions in the not only composed of Turks or Muslims, but also were from various millets and nationalities, the most troublesome of whom were the Albanians. The influx of refugees to Istanbul added greatly to the problems of the already seething capital beset by unemployment.
The hungry and workless crowds were prone to riot and rebellion. One of the major ways in which they expressed their anger and contempt for the Porte and the luxury loving Ottoman court was arson 12).
In the decade 1720-30 arson was a danger to the capital itself.
Unable to meet the domestic need for government spending, the Porte was forced to enact new revenue producing measures and taxes in I726-27 in order to meet the needs of the war against Esref Shah, the Afghan invader. No sooner had a treaty been signed with Esref Shah in 1727 than the Porte was confronted with renewed threats from Nadir Shah, the Persian conqueror, who was rapidly aggrandizing power and property in Persia. The economic measures of the Grand Vizier not only alienated the Janissaries, provincial soldiery and put increased burdens on the reaya, but it also put new demands on the esnaf (artisans and skilled craftmen), the petite [in some cases not so petite] bourgeoisie of Istanbul. The esnaf's complaints centered on what they considered three major problems: (i) the continued debasement of the currency and the problems which accompanied it; (2) the changes resulting in the guild system of the esnaf because of the influx of emigrants from Anatolia and Rumeli; (3) the army tax (ordu akgesi) extracted from the esnaf in time of mobilization for war 13a) However, the fact that the topics which contributed to the Patrona rebellion are the same as those which precipitated the revolt of 1740 necessitates a recapitulation of the significance of the 1730 rebellion. In the words of Professor Enver Karal, this first period of secularization (garpllasmak) represented by the "Tulip Period"-which appeared so promisingly to introduce needed reorganization and reform into the Empire -was ended with the outbreak of the Patrona Halil rebellion. The 1730o rebellion created a situation in which those who wished reform were "opposed by the ulema, Janissaries and the people of Istanbul" 15). Professor Karal concludes that antagonism between the two groups resulted in a cultural state of instability; in the rebellions subsequent to I730 victories belonged to the second group. Those Sultans who desired reform too ardently were deposed and their Grand Viziers killed, usually in a cruel manner. A rebellion served notice to a "reforming" Sultan and his ministers that more imitation of Europe, whether in terms of culture or capitalism, would not be where the coppersmiths made pots, pans, kettles, and cauldrons 25). The British ambassador states that the rebellion broke out in the quarter of Istanbul where the old clothes were sold, which would have been the flea bazar "). According to Everard Fawkener, the rebellion started when seventeen or eighteen people who seemed to be quarreling among themselves suddenly broke apart with drawn swords. One of the men then pulled a green flag 27) out of his bosom which he attached to a staff that he evidently had brought along for that purpose. The rebels cried in unison that all of the shops should be shut and invited "all good Mussulmans to follow them" 28). The uproar spread quickly all over the city and the rumors of rebellion caused mass confusion as shopkeepers hurried to close their shops and to seek shelter. After surging through the coppersmiths' market, the crowd moved, lik a "pack of Everard Fawkener thought that the hatt-t hiimayun which ordered all shopkeepers to keep their shops open during a rebellion was a remarkable proclamation in that the shopkeepers were also commanded on threat of being hanged from their own shopdoors to take up arms and to attack the insurgents 42). Three days later (June 9) there was another flare-up, but before it could gather momentum it was suppressed by the people in the neighborhood (mahalle) where it occurred. The people fell upon the rebels and "knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they were directed" by the hatt-t himayun which had called for the retaliation on the part of the esnaf who had been armed for this purpose. There were those in Istanbul who were of the opinion that the June 9 outbreak was not a general uprising of the people, but rather only a quarrel among Janissaries. But the suppression of it by the esnaf and people of the neighborhood could have given great offense to the Janissaries. According to Fawkener the retaliation on the part of the esnaf was detested by the Janissaries and it made the hatt-i hiimayun seem ill judged, for now the esnaf-many of whom were Christians and Jews-were called upon to take arms against the It would be well perhaps to leave the British ambassador's statement as put, but it is at once too highly provocative and of potential significance not to attempt to unravel the "jumble of power and dependence" to which he alludes. We have evidence from Kinnoull's statement of April 4/15, 1731, that the "merchants and tradesmen of the city will always be ready to join in his [the Sultan's] favor". It was indeed a drastic switch of allegiance when we recall that the esnaf were among the major opponents of Ahmet III who were instrumental in precipitating the Patrona Halil rebellion. It does, however, partially explain the greater degree of stability that Mahmut I was able to obtain on his accession, despite recurring outbreaks, in contrast to his predecessor. The decision of the esnaf to support rather than to oppose the Sultan was due, in part, to the promise of Sultan Mahmut I to rescind the "extraordinary" campaign taxes which had been the main grievance of the esnaf prior to the rebellion in September of 1730. But the support which the esnaf gave the Sultan after 1730 was also doubtlessly encouraged by the continual upheavels and disturbances which greatly curtailed their business activities.
It is also significant that Everard Fawkener, the successor of Lord Kinnoull to the Istanbul Residency46), writing almost nine years later in his dispatch of June 17, 1740, was cognizant of the esnaf's support of the Sultan, at least, in regard to the Janissary and popular insurrections. Are we to assume then that it was the accepted policy of the British residents to recognize that the esnaf supported the Sultan to the extent that they were armed, even if unwillingly, in order to help suppress popular and Janissary insurrections?
The activities of the esnaf between the years 1730o and 1740 implies that they must have been aware of the dangers and the risks their new positions of importance gave them and the opposition this generated on the part of the Janissaries and the Muslim population. Increased tension between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities was indicated by the reimposition of the sumptuary laws in January, 1742. 
46) Lord Kinnoull was replaced as British Resident in Istanbul by

